"The public, the pundits, and even the policy-makers were amazed when the ideological and political conflict that had endangered the world for half a century came to an end in 1990. How did it happen? And why had the Cold War lasted so long? In his new book, Melvyn P. Leffler offers an interpretation, much of it based on newly released archives, of what President George H. W. Bush has called "a struggle for the soul of mankind."" "Leffler homes in on four crucial episodes when American and Soviet leaders considered modulating, avoiding, or ending hostilities and asks why they failed: Stalin and Truman devising new policies in the seasons right after the Allied victory in 1945; Malenkov and Eisenhower exploring the chance for peace after Stalin's death in 1955; Kennedy, Khruschchev, and LBJ trying to reduce tensions after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; and Brezhnev and Carter aiming to sustain detente after the Helsinki Conference of 1975. All these leaders glimpsed the possibilities for peace, yet, Leffler argues, they allowed ideologies, political pressures, the expectations of allies and clients, the dynamics of the international system, and their own fearful memories to trap them in a cycle of hostility that seemed to have no end." "Despite these inflexibilities and failures, by the 1980s Reagan, Bush, and above all, Gorbachev were finally able to extricate themselves from the policies and mind-sets that had imprisoned their predecessors. Leffler's analysis shows how this reconfiguration of the bipolar world came about, after decades of confrontation, and how important the victory was - not just for the two superpowers but for the entire globe."--BOOK JACKET. Distributed by Syndetic Solutions, Inc.

Starred Review. Drawing on extensive research in American and Soviet archives, Bancroft Prize winner Leffler (A Preponderance of Power) offers a scintillating account of the forces that constrained Soviet and American leaders in the second half of the 20th century. Leffler begins by admitting that he was shocked by the rapid demise of communism. If Reagan and Gorbachev could end the Cold War, why hadn't earlier leaders been able to do so? To answer that question, Leffler examines five crucial moments when Washington and Moscow thought about avoiding or modulating the extreme tension between them. At the end of WWII, Leffler says, Stalin thought that cooperation with the West might be preferable to entrenched hostility. Yet he and Truman were pressed by an international order that engendered... fear to make decisions that led to Cold War and shaped policy for decades. Leffler examines why Eisenhower and Malenkov couldn't wipe the slate clean after Stalin's death; how Khrushchev, Kennedy and Johnson reacted to the pressures of international allies and domestic political enemies; why détente foundered under Carter and Brezhnev, and what circumstances allowed leaders of the 1980s to focus on common interests rather than differences. Leffler has produced possibly the most readable and insightful study of the Cold War yet. 47 b&w illus., 6 maps. (Sept.) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. From: Reed Elsevier Inc. Copyright Reed Business Information

After five decades of constant tension, three "hot" wars, numerous surrogate wars, and a near Armageddon over Cuba, the cold war ended, not with a bang but a whimper. Faster than anyone could have expected (or hoped), the Soviet economy came close to implosion, while satellites in Eastern Europe broke free, with virtual Soviet acquiescence. So it is left to historians to consider why the cold war began, why it endured, and why it ended. Professor Leffler has the benefit of almost two decades of hindsight as well as access to recently declassified American and Soviet documents. The result is a series of fresh and often provocative perspectives on the struggle. But Leffler is no dogmatic revisionist with an ideological ax to grind. He lays the causes of the conflict on the totalitarian monstrosity created by Stalin in which a mixture of hostility and paranoia was hardwired into the system. However, he does not view the length of the struggle as inevitable. Critics will find much to dispute here, particularly Leffler's focus on the personal qualities of leaders. Freeman, Jay. From: Syndetics Solutions, Inc. Distributed by Syndetic Solutions, Inc.

Melvyn P. Leffler is Edward Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia. Distributed by Syndetic Solutions, Inc.